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THE ALBRECHT RULE AND CONSUMER WELFARE:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ROGER D. BLn k*

DAVID L. KAsmuMN**
INTRODUCTION

Designed to preserve competitive product pricing,' section I of the Sherman
Antitrust Act prohibits price fixing.2 Since the rule's inception, the Supreme

Court has not allowed a reasonableness defense to a section 1 violation.3 Instead, the court determined that competitively determined prices were reasonable and that collusively determined prices were not.4 Early Supreme Court
*Professor of Economics, University of Florida. B.A., 1964, MA. 1966, Ph.D., 1968, Michigan State University.
*Associate Professor of Economics, University of Tennessee. B.S., 1980, University of
Tennessee; Ph.D., 1976, University of Florida.
The authors have received financial support from the Public Policy Research Center at
the University of Florida. We have also received very helpful suggestions from Jerrold K.
Guben, Robert F. Lanzillotti and Stephen Rubin on an earlier version.
1. R. POSNER, ANurrauSr LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERsPEcrIVE, 24-26 (1976).
2. For a purview of early judicial treatment under the Sherman Act, see generally Note,
The Rule of Reason in Loose-Knit Combinations, 32 COLUm. L. Rv. 291 (1932). Initially, the
Supreme Court interpreted section 1 of the Sherman Act by looking to the "reasonableness"
of the challenged conduct in each case - known as the "rule of reason" approach. See Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See also Allison,
Ambiguous PriceFixing and the Sherman Act: Simplistic Labels or Unavoidable Analysis?, 16
Hous. L. Ray. 761, 763-66 (1979).
The language of the Sherman Antitrust Act was deliberately left vague to allow courts to
develop the precise conduct to be prohibited. Section 1 provides in relevant part: "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
15 U.S.C. §1 (1976).
3. Although the language of section I forbids all restraints of trade, many defendants in.
price fixing cases have asserted that the law should not apply to them because the prices they
set were reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 574-78 (1898)
(Railroad defendant attempted to justify price fixing by claiming necessity in order to prevent
industrial strife because of "cutthroat" competition); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897) (defense similar to Joint-Traffic not accepted). See also United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1933) (Justice Stone held that since every
price fixing agreement eliminates some form of competition, then price-fixing, even if
reasonable, would be illegal). This argument, however, has no economic basis because competitive prices are per se reasonable.
4. Early Supreme Court opinions emphasized that free competition was sole consideration
to determine Sherman Act violations. For example, in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918), the Court stated that "[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint
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applications of the rule focused theoretically on the market price impact of any
challenged conduct.r The Court, however, did not require proof of the conduct's actual effect on market price. Rather, it merely required that enough
evidence exist to sustain a reasonable inference that the challenged behavior
would likely increase the market price above a competitively determined level.,
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court focused on the general
market situation of the product and the aggregate power of the colluding firms
within that market.7 Accordingly, analysis of price fixing violations centered
on economic criteria.
The Court in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc.,) however, departed from this economic focus. In Socony-Vacuum, the Court held the mere
attempt to charge a monopoly price to be a section 1 violation. Furthermore,
the Court did not require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant likely
had the power necessary to effectuate monopoly prices. 9 The rule against price
fixing, therefore, became more a part of the law of conspiracy than the law of
monopoly. 1 Consequently, antitrust authorities 1 have ignored the economic
aspects of price fixing. This abandonment of the economic focus of price fixing
has adversely impacted on contemporary antitrust law. A particularly egregious
example of the negative effects of this shift in emphasis is provided by the
Supreme Court case, Albrecht v. Herald Co.12 In Albrecht, the Court held that
maximum resale price fixing violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 13
This article will trace briefly the rule against maximum resale price fixing
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id. at 238. Competitively determined
prices are determined by the unfettered forces of supply and demand. Because these prices
result from market forces, they are inherently "reasonable" although they may be quite high.
Collusively determined prices are determined administratively by the suppliers. Although
market forces admittedly influence the level of collusive prices, these forces are restrained. As
a result, consumers lose the benefit of a free market.
5. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407 (1911) (agreements between dealers having the purpose of destroying competition and fixing prices are
void); Addyston Pipe Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 236-38 (1899) (Sherman Act
violation predicated on a finding that price competition had been practically eliminated in
substantial parts of the country.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 577 (1898) (the consolidation
of two competing railroads is a Sherman violation because it tends to raise rates) (emphasis
added).
7. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1910).
8. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
9. In Justice Douglas' famous footnote 59, he wrote "[t]he existence or exertion of power
to accomplish the desired objective . . . becomes important only in cases where the offense
charged is the actual monopolizing of any part of trade or commerce in violation of §2 of the
Act .
I.."
Id. at 226 and n-59.
10. R. POSNER, supra note I, at 25. See generally, Note, Prosecutions for Attempt to
Monopolize: The Relevance of the Relevant Market, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 110 (1967).
11. The antitrust laws are enforced by the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission. Price fixing cases are usually prosecuted by the
Department of Justice.
12. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
13. Id. at 153-54.
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and examine the current vitality of the rule as it exists presently. A simple
model of derived demand will be used to demonstrate the deleterious economic
effects of the current price fixing rule.' 4 In particular, it will be shown that the
prohibition against maximum price fixing works to the detriment of the consumer. Finally, attempts to circumvent the present rule will be shown to conflict with other legal theories. The economic analysis used herein will provide
a persuasive argument for the Court to re-examine the utility of the prohibition
against maximum resale price fixing.
JUDICIAL TRFATMENT OF MAxIMUM PRIcE-FIXING

Although the Socony-Vacuum case involved a horizontal conspiracy to restrict the supply and thereby raise the price of gasoline, it also applies to the
setting of maximum resale prices. Justice Douglas, in a sweeping condemnation
of any price fixing action, stated: "[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."' 5 The language concerning depressing prices remained
mere dictum until the Supreme Court's decision in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.'6 In Kiefer-Stewart, Seagram and Calvert, liquor producers, agreed not to sell their products to any wholesaler who refused to respect their pre-set maximum resale prices. Kiefer-Stewart, a liquor wholesaler,
refused to accept the Seagram-Calvert restrictions. Accordingly, they were
denied access to Seagram and Calvert products. Kiefer-Stewart brought suit
alleging illegal price fixing under the Sherman Act. Seagram and Calvert responded by asserting that they had set maximum resale prices to counterbalance a horizontal price fixing conspiracy among its wholesale customers.Y7
The Court, however, ruled that Seagram and Calvert's illegal conduct was not
justified by proving that Kiefer-Stewart had also engaged in illegal price fixing. In reaffirming Socony-Vacuum, the Court noted that agreements to fix
maximum resale prices restrain the exercise of independent business judgment,
thereby crippling free trade.' 8
14. Areeda and Turner apparently share our opinion of this rule. Their feelings are
foreshadowed, but not fully developed in 3 P. ARmA & D. TuRNER, ANrrusr LAw 216
(1978). Based on the holding in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977), Professor Posner also believes the Albrecht rule will not survive. See Posner, The Rule
of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1, 12 (1977). Even some commentators who are generally suspicious of vertical restraints
appreciate the deleterious impact of the Albrecht rule. See, e.g., Bohling, A Simplified Rule
of Reason for Vertical Restraints: IntegratingSocial Goals, Economic Analysis and Sylvania,
64 IowA L. REv. 461,5 19-21 (1979).
15. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). In Catalano, Inc.
v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980), the Supreme Court recently cited the SoconyVacuum language with obvious approval.
16. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). See generally Comment, The Per Se Illegality of Price FixingSans Power, Purpose, or Effect, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 837 (1952).
17. Id. at 214. Justice Black noted that the Seventh Circuit felt that fixing maximum
resale prices "promoted rather than restrained competition." Id. at 212.
18. Id. at 213.
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Adhering to the Kiefer-Stewart reasoning, the Supreme Court held a maximum price fixing scheme illegal in Albrecht v. Herald Co."0 In Albrecht, the
Globe-Democrat, a St. Louis newspaper, assigned exclusive territories to its
distributors. This practice minimized the cost of providing home delivery by
eliminating duplicate effort. Because each distributor was given a territorial
monopoly, the Globe-Democrat had the power to terminate distributors who
charged more than the advertised price. Although Albrecht, a distributor, was
aware of the maximum price limitation, he ignored it and charged a higher
price. After several customer complaints, the Globe-Democrat warned Albrecht
that he was jeopardizing his distributorship. Nevertheless, Albrecht continued
to overcharge his customers. In response, the Globe-Democrat first competed
directly with Albrecht, and later assigned a portion of Albrecht's territory to
another distributor. Albrecht then brought suit claiming that the pricing
scheme violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. Consequently, the GlobeDemocrat terminated his route and forced him to sell his distributorship. At
trial, the jury found that no Sherman Act violation had occurred. Distinguishing Kiefer-Stewart, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that because the
Globe-Democrat had granted exclusive territories, the price fixing was necessary to insure competition which would protect the public from overcharging
by the dealers.2 0 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and rejected this
distinction stating "the assertion that illegal price fixing is justified because it
blunts the pernicious consequences of another distribution practice is unpersuasive."21 Instead, the Supreme Court followed the Kiefer-Stewart independent judgment-free trade analysis, concluding that the maximum price
fixing scheme deprived the distributor of his ability to compete freely within
the market place.2 2 Accordingly, the court held that the price fixing scheme
2
violated section I of the Sherman Act. 3
The Albrecht case continues to be the dispositive authority on the resale
price fixing prohibition. Although the Supreme Court has had an opportunity
to review and perhaps revise the rule, they have denied certiorari in a case
similar to Albrecht.24 Consequently, section 1 of the Sherman Act continues to
prohibit the setting of maximum price ceilings.
When Are Maximum Resale PricesFixed?
A supplier invariably uses maximum resale price fixing to prevent its distributors from exploiting their market power. In Kiefer-Stewart, wholesale
distributors conspired to raise prices by establishing a minimum sales price.
The manufacturers, Seagram and Calvert, sought to prevent the inevitable
decline in sales that accompanies a price increase. Accordingly, they fixed the
maximum price that each distributor could charge for their products. Although
individually each wholesale distributor had minimal monopoly power, collec19.

390 U.S. 145, 153-54.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

367 F.2d 517, 523-25 (8th Cir. 1966).
890 U.S. at 154.
Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 154.
See Knutson v. Daily Rev., 548 F.2d 795, cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
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tively they tried to emulate the price and output that a monopolist would
select. 25 Maximum price fixing restrictions, however, thwarted their intentions.
Albrecht clearly demonstrates a supplier's rationale for establishing maximum prices. The distributor, Albrecht, was granted a complete monopoly for
home delivery in his exclusive territory. The Globe-Democrat sought to prevent
Albrecht from abusing his monopoly power. Fixing the maximum resale price
of the Globe-Democrataccomplished that objective.2
In both Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht the manufacturers enjoyed market
power from product differentiation provided by the brand names of Seagram
and Calvert, or as the only seller of an evening newspaper. The distributors
also enjoyed market power through the collusion of horizontal competitors27 or
through exclusive territories.2s Economists have recognized this as a problem of
successive monopolies in the chain of distribution.9 A simple model of derived
demand provided in the next section will facilitate analysis of the Albrecht
rule against maximum resale price fixing.
Before examining this economic model, it should be noted that Professor
Sullivan provides an alternative interpretation of the Albrecht rule. He fears
that maximum resale price fixing oligopolistically limits pricing, thereby preventing market entry.3 0 For example, suppose four bakeries provide service in
a local market. If their prices approached the monopoly level, new firms would
enter and compete in this market until the monopoly profits disappeared.S1
Arguably, under some circumstances the four firms could set prices below the
monopoly level but above the competitive level, and still earn some monopoly
profits, while discouraging new firms from entering the market. 2 There are
several reasons why this theory fails to apply to maximum resale price fixing.
First, collusion does not appear to be necessary. One firm could simply reduce
its price to the entry deterring level and thereby force the other three firms to
follow suit. Second, it is not clear why the four firms can have supracompetitive
25. The relationship between the multi-plant monopoly and the cartel is developed carefully in Patinkin, Multiple-Plant Firms, Cartels, and Imperfect Competition, 61 Q.J. ECON.
173 (1947).
26. Professor Rosse has demonstrated that the actions of distributors like Albrecht can
result in everyone - the subscribers, the publisher and even the distributor -being worse off.
See Rosse, Vertical Price Fixing in Newspaper Distribution: A Per Se Rule That Makes
Everyone Worse Off, (unpublished manuscript, May 1980).

27. Recall that Kiefer-Stewart had been conspiring with other wholesalers.
28. Under an exclusive territory scheme, each distributor has the exclusive privilege of
distributing the producer's output in a specific geographic market. Consequently, there is no
competition at the distribution level. In Albrecht, the newspaper publisher awarded exclusive
territories to each of his distributors. This made each distributor a monopolist in its assigned
territory.

29. See, e.g., Machiup & Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical
Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101 (1960) (classic discussion of successive monopoly and other
important related matters).
80. L. SULLivAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrTRuST 211 (1977).
31. If there is no artificial barrier to entry, monopoly profits will attract entry into that
industry. As long as these profits provide a return on investment above the competitive rate,
the incentive for outsiders to enter remains.
32. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKIEr STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 232-52
(2d ed. 1980) (overview of the limit pricing literature with pertinent references).
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profits without attracting other firms into the market. Finally, and most importantly, Sullivan's conjecture appears to be void of empirical content. The
Supreme Court cases discussed herein all involved a successive monopoly situation where an economic agent with some market power unilaterally and
vertically imposed fixed prices. In Sullivan's example, the horizontal conspiracy among the four bakeries presents an antitrust problem independent of
vertical price restrictions. Thus, Sullivan's model fails as inapplicable to
vertical price fixing.
A

SIMPLE MODEL OF DERIVED DEMAND

Many vertical restraints involve products that are not altered physically as
they move through the distribution network. Where the seller performs merely
a distribution function, a so-called fixed proportions relationship exists between
the input and the output. For example, for every television set sold to a retail
customer there must be one television set sold by the manufacturer to the distributor. An economic analysis of this situation with and without competitive
distributors will be formulated.
CompetitionAmong Distributors
Initially, it will be assumed that distributors operate in a competitive
market while manufacturers enjoy some lawful horizontal market power due,
for example, to a patent.3 3 The manufacturer sells his product to an extensive
network of competitive retail distributors that, in turn, sell the product to the
final consumers. The retail distributors demand the product only to the extent
that final consumers demand it from them. Consequently, the distributors'
demand is derived from the consumer demand. This derived demand, as the
demand function, dictates the optimal price and output decision of the manufacturer. Figure 1 illustrates a relatively simple model depicting this situation.
In Figure 1, D, represents the retail customers' demand for the final product, which shows the usual inverse relationship between price and quantity.3'
This model assumes the distributor's per unit (or average) cost of performing
the retail function remains constant regardless of the quantity sold. Where this
is the case, the marginal (or incremental) cost also remains constant and equal
to the average cost.3 5 Constant marginal costs are consistent with free entry
and exit at both the retail distribution level and the competitive input markets
for the retail distribution industry as a whole. In Figure 1, MCR represents the
marginal cost of retailing.
The demand for the manufacturer's product by the retail distributors is
derived from the retail consumers' demand for the product s6 The retail de33. The source of this market power is really not important, but by attributing it to a
patent, attention will not be deflected to irrelevant issues. In other words, the legality of the
manufacturer's market power is assumed.
34. Generally, the quantity demanded of a product is inversely related to its price. Accordingly, as price rises, a smaller quantity of the product will be demanded.
55. To aid in reader comprehension, the incremental retailing cost is assumed to be
constant.
86. For example, a retailer of television sets demands as many sets from his producer as
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FIGURE 1
DERIvED DEmAND OF RETAIL DISTRIBUTORS FOR mANUFAcruRER'S ouTPuT:
COMPETITION IN RETAILING.

mand curve DR shows the maximum price consumers will pay for the final
good. Given the final demand DR in Figure 1, the highest price consumers will
pay minus the costs of performing the retailing function results in the maxthe retailer has customers demanding the television sets from him. Thus, the producer ex-

periences a demand by his retailers which is derived from the demand of the retailer's customers.
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imum figure that the retailers can profitably pay the manufacturer. Consequently, the retailers' maximum affordable price or derived demand is d
where d = DR - MCR. The marginal revenue function associated with d is mr.37
The model assumes the manufacturer is interested in maximizing profits. 35
To accomplish this objective, the manufacturer selects an output such that his
marginal production costs are equal to the marginal revenue associated with
the derived demand. Figure 2 reproduces from Figure 1 the final demand DR,
the derived demand d with the associated marginal revenue mr, and the
marginal cost of retailing MCR. The manufacturer's marginal production cost
(mc) is added to the model and is assumed to be constant.3 9 The manufacturer's
optimal (i.e., profit maximizing) output results when marginal revenue equals
marginal cost. In Figure 2, this is shown as Q1, where mr intersects mc. This
output will be sold at a price of P1 to the competitively organized distributors.
Accordingly, the manufacturer earns a monopoly profit 40 on each unit of output
equal to the difference between his per unit cost of production and the price:
P, - mc. His total profit is P , - mc times the quantity sold Q.
Competition among the retail distributors will cause the price to the final
customer to equal the price charged by the manufacturer plus the marginal
cost of retailing. Because the vertical distance between the retail demand
curve DR and the derived demand d precisely equals the marginal cost of retailing MCR, the final retail price shown in Figure 2 denoted by P,, is a market
clearing price for a quantity of Q1. 41 The competitive retailers earn a competitive rate of return since their price PR, just equals their costs: P, plus MC,.
Under the conditions specified (i.e., fixed proportions in production with
competition at the distribution stage) the manufacturer extracts all the monopoly profit through the price and output decision regarding the intermediate
product. That is, the final product price and quantity equal those that would
37. The relationship between demand and marginal revenue can be found in every
standard treatment of microeconomics. Total sales revenue is the product of the quantity
sold and the price of the product. Thus, total revenue is reflected by the product of the
coordinates of the points on the demand curve. A marginal revenue function is associated
with a total revenue function. Marginal revenue refers to the change in total sales revenue
for a small change in the quantity sold. In other words, marginal revenue describes what
happens to total revenue when the producer expands the quantity sold by a small amount.
For linear demand curves, the marginal revenue function bisects the horizontal distance between the price axis and the demand curve. For a more extensive discussion, consult
C. McCONNELL, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES

492-94 (7th ed. 1978).

58. Although this assumption has been challenged, most economic analysis proceeds on
this assumption. Empirically, relying upon the assumption of profit maximization has not led
to discordant results. For a brief survey of the literature and ample references, see F. ScHERER,
supra note 32, at 29-41.
39. Constant marginal production costs can result from production in a single plant
according to a linearly homogeneous production function which has been combined with
competitive input markets. Alternatively, constant marginal production costs can result from
multiplant production and competitive input markets.
40. The manufacturer is able to exploit his monopoly power to earn a higher than competitive profit, which is generally referred to as monopoly profit.
41. A market clearing price for a specific output level is the price on the demand curve
that corresponds to the specific quantity. At that price, buyers will select precisely the quantity
specified.
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PRICE AND
COST

PI + MCR= MC

PRI

PII
[tD

R

I

me
d DR- MCR

MCR

Ii

0

QIQUANTITY

mr

FIGURE 2
PROFrr MAXIMIZING PRICE AND OUTPUT FOR THE MANUFACTURER.

result from a vertically integrated monopoly that controlled both the manufacture and distribution.2 Consequently, the manufacturer has no need for
vertical control. This, however, is not always the case. For various reasons,
there is often an absence of competition among distributors, creating an incentive for vertical control of some aspect of the distribution system.
42. See Machlup & Taber, supra note 29; Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust
Policy, 58 J. Por. EcON. 347 (1950).
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No CompetitionAmong Distributors
For many products, franchisees possessing some local monopoly power conduct retail distribution. In some instances, the manufacturer assigns exclusive
territories to the franchisees. A classic example of this involves the distribution
of newspapers. 43 In other cases, exclusivity is not guaranteed, but the cost
structure of the franchisee's business indicates that excessive intra-brand competition among distributors would lead to failures. Therefore, the manufacturer
spaces the franchisees in such a way that each one can be a viable business
entity. The distribution of automobiles is an example of this.4 4 Because financial success necessitates a substantial sales volume, a local market must be
larger than a critical size or it will not support more than one dealer. 45 Unfortunately, this local monopoly power invites each distributor to maximize its
profit by restricting output below the level that the manufacturer finds optimal.
Suppose for example, the manufacturer sells his output to final consumers
through a nation-wide system of distributors. Due to the nature of the distribution function, the manufacturer establishes only one distributor in each
geographic sub-market. DR represents the retail demand for the product in
Figure 3 along with the associated marginal revenue MRR. MCR denotes the
marginal cost of retailing. If the retail distribution were competitively organized, the curve labelled )R - MCR would be the derived demand. The curve
marginal to DR - MCR is labelled d, which equals MRR - MCR.
Since the retail distributor is a local monopolist, he will maximize profits
by equating his marginal revenue with his marginal cost.46 The curve labelled
d = MRR - MCR is marginal revenue minus the marginal cost of retailing. For
the distributor, marginal cost results from adding the sum of the price charged
by the manufacturer to the marginal cost of retailing. Thus, the distributor
selects his profit maximizing output by equating the price he has to pay to the
manufacturer with the net marginal revenue MRI - MCR. Consequently, when
the distributor has a local monopoly, the derived demand for the sub-market
is d.
The manufacturer exploits his monopoly power by selecting his price and
output where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Figure 4 reproduces the
curves from Figure 3, but adds the curve marginal to d, labelled mr. In addition, the diagram includes the manufacturer's marginal production cost mc.
The manufacturer produces Q, units of output for this market and charges P1
per unit. This price and output generates profit for the manufacturer of P - mc
per unit. Thus, his total profit is P1 - mc times Q, units of output.
The distributor's marginal cost (MC) equals the price he pays to the manufacturer (P1 ) plus the marginal cost of retailing (MCI). The distributor max43.

See notes 19-29 and accompanying text, supra. (Albrecht discussion).

44. See generally B.

PASHIGIAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF

AUTOMOBILES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

OF THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM (1961).

45. For example, it is not in the interest of General Motors to have so many competing
dealers that each is on the brink of financial ruin.
46. In other words, the profit maximizing quantity is found at the intersection of marginal
revenue and marginal cost.
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MRR
d= MRR-MCR

FIGURE 3
DERmVE

DEMAND OF RETAIL DISTIMBUTION FOR MANUFACrURED OUTPUT:
LOCAL MONOPOLY IN RETAII"NG.

imizes his profit by equating this marginal cost (P1 + MCR) to his marginal
revenue (MRu). Consequently, the distributor sells Q2 units of output to retail
customers at a retail price of P2. By earning excess profits of P2 - MC per unit
of output times the number of units sold the distributor benefits from his status
as a local monopolist.
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PRICE AND
COST

P,
MC=P I + MCR

I

.DR

~mc
D-MC
R

MCR

0

QUANTITY

Q

MRR
d=MRR-MCR
mr

FIGURE 4
PRoFrr MAXIMIZATION: SUCCESSIVE MONOPOLY.

A Comparison Of Industry Profits
A comparison of two situations demonstrates the adverse effects of successive
monopoly on the manufacturer's profits. First, the results developed above will
be compared with the graphical models. This will be followed with an examination of a numerical example. Figure 5 combines the results of Figures 2 and
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FIGURE 5
COMPARISON OF PRICE AND OUTPUT FOR TWO CASES.

4. It is evident that the successive monopoly at the production and distribution
stages reduces output from Q, to Q2 and raises the price to the consumer from
PR, to P2. The manufacturer's excess profits are reduced from P, - mc times Q1
to P. - mc times Q. At the same time, the excess profits at the distribution
stage go from zero to P2 - MG times Q. It can be numerically shown that total
profits of the manufacturer and of the distributor are lower with a successive,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1981], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXMI

monopoly than with a monopoly of manufacturing and competitive distribu4
tion. 7
A Numerical Example. A numerical example of how this process operates
helps to make these results more tangible. Suppose that the retail demand function is given by
PR = $100-2Q,
the marginal cost of retailing is
MCR = $10,
and the marginal cost of production is
mc = $50.
When retailing is competitive, the derived demand facing the manufacturer is
P = PR-MC,
or
P = $90-2Q.
For the manufacturer, the marginal revenue function is
mr = $90 - 4Q.
Given the marginal cost of production (MC) of $50, equating marginal cost
and marginal revenue yields the optimal output of ten units. Substituting this
quantity into the derived demand obtains the manufacturer's optimal price to
the retailer: $70. Substituting this quantity into the retail demand function produces a price to the retail customer of $80. Notice that the retail price exactly
equals the manufacturer's price plus the per unit cost of retailing. Consequently,
the retailer earns no profit. The manufacturer earns a profit of $70 (10) - 50 (10)
= $200. Table 1 summarizes these results.
This can be contrasted to the successive monopoly case. Recall that the derived demand in this case equals the marginal revenue of the preceding case.
Thus, the derived demand is now
P = 90-4Q
and the corresponding marginal revenue curve is
mr = 90-8Q.
The retail demand, the marginal cost of retailing, and the marginal production
cost are all assumed to remain constant. Equating marginal production cost
with the new marginal revenue yields the optimum output of five units. Substitution into the derived demand reveals that the manufacturer will continue
to charge the retailer $70 per unit. Substitution into the final demand function
shows that the smaller output now sells at retail for $90 per unit.
The retailer's total revenue is $450 while his total costs are only $400. Thus,
the retailer now earns a positive profit of $50, but the manufacturer's profits
fall. His revenue is $350 while his costs are $250. Accordingly, his profits are
reduced to $100. Note that total industry sales fell from 10 units to 5 units and
the price to the consumer rose from $80 to $90. Total industry profit fell from
$200 to $150 and the manufacturer and retailer share the smaller amount. In
this case, the manufacturer's quest for higher profits coincides with the consumer interest in lower prices.
47. Simply by looking at the areas in the graph this result is obvious but it is also general
for all situations where demand is linear and cost is constant. A mathematical proof is available from the authors upon request.
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF COMPETITIVE AND MONOPOLISTIC
RETAILING
Competitive
Retailing

Successive
Monopoly

Retail demand (D.)

P = 100-2Q

PR = 100 - 2Q

Marginal cost of retailing (MC.)

MCR = $10

MCR = $10

Marginal cost of production (mc)

mc = $50

mc = $50

Derived demand (d)

P = Pi - MCR

P = 90-4Q

= 90-2Q
mr = 90-

Marginal revenue (mr)

mr = 90

Optimal output

Q = 10

Q = 5

Price to retailer (P)

P = $70

P = $70

Price to consumer (P,)

PR = $80

Pn = $90

Profit:
to retailer
to manufacturer

-

4Q

-0-

$ 50

$200

$100

8Q

THE RoLE OF MAxIMUM RESALE PRIcES

It should be fairly obvious that the manufacturer will oppose a profit re-

duction below his maximum level. He may respond to this by establishing maximum resale prices. If the manufacturer establishes a maximum resale price of
PR, the distributor's marginal revenue curve coincides with Pa1 for all outputs
between zero and Q. This prevents the distributor from restricting output
below Q, because the distributor's marginal cost will equal his marginal

revenue at Q, units of output. Unfortunately, as exhibited earlier, current
judicial precedent unwisely prohibits the setting of maximum resale prices.
Fixing maximum resale prices restores the price and quantity that would
result from competition at the distribution stage, therefore resulting in lower
prices and greater consumption for the retail customer. Thus, an antitrust

policy prohibiting maximum resale prices harms the consumer.4 Furthermore,
it protects the franchisee, whose interest in excess profits is not a legitimate
concern of the antitrust laws.4 9 Such a policy thwarts the manufacturer's efforts
to combat the successive restriction of output which inexorably follows the

successive monopoly market structure. As a result, prevailing antitrust law has
the perverse effect of diminishing consumer welfare rather than promoting it.50
48. For a persuasive argument that consumer welfare is the sole legitimate goal of the
antitrust laws, see R. Bopa, THE ANrusT PARADox: A PoLicY AT WAR wrrH ITSELF 50-89
(1978). Contra, Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources
of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. Ruv. 1214 (1977).
49. See notes 95-103 and accompanying text, infra for an argument that consumer welfare
is the only legitimate concern of the antitrust laws.
50. Consumer welfare is dearly diminished when prices rise because fewer products are
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At this point, it is appropriate to recognize that maximum resale prices are
usually not contrary to the expectations of the distributor. In the Albrecht case,
for example, the franchise agreement provided that each distributor could
charge no more than the price that the publisher advertised for home delivery',
Consequently, the distributor could not legitimately claim to have made an
investment based upon the belief that he would be free to set prices as he saw
fit. Thus, no serious question of fairness to the distributor requires resolution.
In Kiefer-Stewart, the wholesaler was not really a franchisee. 52 Nonetheless,
both Seagram and Calvert instituted their maximum resale price policy after
Kiefer-Stewart began distributing their products. In this instance, however,
Seagram and Calvert responded to collusion at the wholesaling stage, which
changed the market structure to one of successive monopoly. In other words,
the wholesaler's collusion created a monopoly upon price and output.
In principle, the simple model developed above applies to the more complex case of multiple products. For example, many retail food franchises distribute multiple products.53 The success of these operations depends in part
upon maintaining fairly uniform quality standards among franchisees and
maintaining relative prices vis-a-vis competitive products. Because neither the
franchisors nor the franchisees benefit from any weakening in consumer confidence caused by disparate prices, 54 the franchisors have an interest in the
prices charged by each franchisee. This interest springs from two sources: first,
the successive monopoly problem discussed above, and second, the potential
spillover effect one franchisee's pricing behavior has on the sales of other
franchisees. For example, it is financially important to all Burger King franchisees that a consumer's expectations are fulfilled when visiting any Burger
King restaurant. If one franchisee disappoints such expectations, the effect of
this franchisee's actions carries over to other franchisees. Because the franchisor
loses profit as a consequence, he has a continuing interest in the behavior of his
franchisees.
RELEVANCE OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESSMAN ARGUMENT

The traditional concern with vertical price fixing involves the independence
of the downstream businessman. For example, Professor Sullivan argues that
the per se illegality of maximum price fixing is consistent with a social interest
in protecting every opportunity a small firm has for independent decision
making. 5 This policy is based upon the assumption that the efficient allocation
of resources attributed to the competitive market can only be achieved if the
consumed. The Albrecht rule prohibits a manufacturer from preventing its distributors from

raising prices thereby reducing quantity.
51. 390 U.S. at 147.
52. 340 U.S. 211.
53. For example, McDonald's, Burger King and Kentucky Fried Chicken distribute
multiple products.
54. For example, a Burger King customer has an idea of what quality sandwich he will
receive when he orders a Whopper. He also has an idea of the approximate price. Just as
extreme quality variation can upset consumer acceptance, so can unusual price variation.
55. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at 210-12.
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independence of each economic agent is guaranteed. In particular, Sullivan
argues that if demand for a product increases, independent businessmen should
be able to raise the price of that product.5 6 When price is free to respond to an
increased demand, the higher price and greater profits for existing firms will
invite outsiders to invest in that industry. As a result, resources will flow into
the industry.
While Professor Sullivan's intentions are admirable, his analysis is premised
upon the existence of a competitively structured environment. In Albrecht,
however, each distributor had an exclusive territory, making it impossible for
outsiders to invest resources in distribution.57 In this environment, preserving
the franchisee's independence permits him to raise prices with impunity. On
the other hand, permitting the franchisor to set maximum prices provides the
same check on pricing excesses that a competitive market structure normally
provides. An examination of the structure of a particular industry invariably
reveals that the fixing of maximum resale prices occurs in response to successive
monopoly and its exploitation58 Consequently, Professor Sullivan's policy
proscriptions are inapplicable to maximum price fixing situations.5 9
A recent Supreme Court decision, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc.,60 provides some insight into the Court's current attitude toward the-policy
of business independence. In Sylvania, the legality of location clauses in
vertical distribution agreements was at issue. Sylvania had adopted a selective
distribution policy with "elbow room" for distributors provided they sold only
from approved locations. After a disagreement concerning the distribution
policy, 61 Sylvania terminated Continental as a dealer. Continental brought suit
claiming that Sylvania's location restriction constituted an unlawful restraint
of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court, however,
rejected the belief that the Sherman Act purports "to prohibit restrictions on
the autonomy of independent businessmen" without analyzing the impact of
such restrictions.62 Consequently, the Court retreated from a non-economic
view of cases involving non-price restrictions. Nevertheless, it is apparent that
the scope of this retreat does not include economic analysis of vertical price
restrictions.63
In Kiefer-Stewart6 4 and Albrecht,65 the Court expressly endorsed the fran56. Id. at 212.
57. 390 U.S. at 145. See notes 19-23 and accompanying text, supra.
58. The economic logic examined in this article compels this result.
59. His concern, however, is well founded for horizontal price fixing cases.
60. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). For a thorough analysis of Sylvania and its impact on antitrust
law, see generally Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions,78 COLUM. L. Rv. 1 (1978). See also Dunfee, Stern & Zelek, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CAL. L. REV. 13 (1980).
61. Id. at 39-40. Continental did not want to respect Sylvania's location clause. When
Continental changed locations over Sylvania's objection, Sylvania terminated Continental.
62. Id. at 53 n.21.
63. Id. at 51 n.18. "As in Schwinn, we are concerned here only with nonprice vertical
restrictions. The per se illegality of price restrictions has been established firmly for many
years and involves significantly different questions of analysis and policy..." Id..
64. 340 U.S. at 213.
65. 390 U.S. at 152-53.
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chisee's decision making autonomy respecting the price that he charged. This
pricing freedom, however, results in reduced output and higher retail prices.
Therefore, it is evident that judicial concern for the welfare of franchisees
contravenes the paramount. concern of consumer welfare. Because the actual
effect of the independent businessman argument is contrary to the promotion
of consumer welfare, the argument must be deemed irrelevant on philosophical
grounds. 66 Furthermore, the existence of an alternative to the setting of maximum prices makes the argument irrelevant on more pragmatic grounds. Although more cumbersome than price fixing, the manufacturer can obtain the
same result through the use of sales quotas. The examination of any simple
demand diagram reveals that at any specified price a unique quantity clears
the market. 67 Similarly, at any specified quantity, only one price will clear the
market. This simple observation can be extended to the earlier analysis.
Figure 5 shows that to achieve maximum profits, the manufacturer needs
an output of Q1. Rather than limit the resale price to PR1, he can simply require the franchisee to sell a specified quantity. By establishing the performance
standard at an output of Q1, the manufacturer achieves his desired result. Thus,
while the performance standard affords the franchisee complete pricing discretion, he can meet this standard only by charging a price of PRI (or lower).
Consequently, his pricing discretion is mostly illusory. Therefore, the view that
merely forbidding maximum resale price fixing preserves a franchisee's independent business judgment is nothing more than a fiction which should be
dispensed with.6 8
It is arguable that because both approaches achieve the same result, it is
irrelevant that one is forbidden. Although this economic equivalence may
appear to obviate the need to abolish the rule against maximum price setting,
performance standards encounter difficulties in enforcement which detract
from its usefulness. Whenever a franchisee/franchisor dispute arises, it appears
as a David and Goliath confrontation. Society's natural sympathies flow to the
franchisee. In the automobile industry, for example, this apparent imbalance
of power resulted in protective legislation for the franchisee69 Similarly,
gasoline retailers are protected by statutes specifying the conditions necessary
66. This follows because the philosophy of antitrust law is the promotion of consumer
welfare. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1939).
67. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text, supra.
68. In franchise situations, the franchisor has an obligation to guarantee certain product
standards. If he fails this obligation, the trademark protection may be lost. No one has
seriously objected to a franchisor's imposition of quality standards. However, quality deterioration is an alternative means of raising price. For example, if a quarter-pounder with
cheese is supposed to sell for $1.00 but the franchisee wants to charge $1.40, the franchisee
could cut the size of a quarter-pounder to three ounces and hold the price at $1.00. The
effect would be the same in both instances. Franchisors are permitted to control this aspect
of the price and product. In a newspaper setting, the publisher can insist that the papers be
delivered no later than a certain time. Thus, quality deterioration can be prevented. It is
clear that important business decisions are not left to independent businessmen. Consequently, one can hardly point to a consistent policy position regarding the desirability of
independence.
69. Automobile dealers are protected by the Dealer's Day in Court Act. 15 U.S.C. §§12211225 (1976).
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for dealer termination.70 Therefore, performance standards furnish an in-

adequate alternative to maximum price fixing.
INCENTIVE FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION

Prior analysis has revealed that through optimal pricing the upstream firm
can extract all the monopoly profit inherent in the market, provided, however,
downstream sales are made at a price equal to marginal and average cost. If
this does not occur at the downstream stage, the altered prices reduce the
upstream firm's profits. This can be seen dearly in Figure 5. With competitive
pricing at the downstream stage, the upstream monopolist's profits are (P, - mc)
Q. In contrast, where a successive monopoly exists the upstream monopolist's
profits are only (P, - mc)Q2 , a great deal smaller.71 This offers the upstream
firm an obvious incentive to vertically integrate forward, that is, perform the
distributor's function himsel.2
The manufacturer, by performing the distribution function, can ensure
the distribution stage price equals his optimal price plus the average cost of
distribution. Thus, vertical ownership integration provides the same profit that
the upstream monopolist would obtain either from fixing maximum resale
prices or from setting performance standards for a downstream monopolist73

In all three cases, the final price-output configuration is of greater public benefit than that provided by unbridled successive monopoly. Therefore, economically equivalent business practices should receive equivalent antitrust
treatment.
In order to minimize the antitrust problems, a manufacturer should begin
operations by performing both the manufacturing and distribution functions.
Due to capital requirements, however, ownership integration may not be
feasible at the firm's inception. Although vertical integration by contract is an
alternative,74 judicial decisions prohibit one key contractual stipulation: the
setting of maximum resale prices.75 Unable to set maximum resale prices, the
70. Gasoline retailers are protected by the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. 15 U.S.C.
§2801 (1976).
71. See generally Machlup &Taber, supranote 29.
72. Given the linear demand curves and constant marginal and average cost, it can be
shown that Q, is precisely one-half of Q,. Consequently, successive monopoly halves the upstream firm's profits. This result follows from the geometric relationship between the curves
labelled d and mr. A proof is available from the authors upon request.
73. A supplier has an incentive to impose vertical control through fixing maximum resale
prices whenever a successive monopoly situation exists. If antitrust law forecloses this option,
the firm may proceed with ownership integration. We should inquire whether this is the
intent of public policy. When certain vertical controls were condemned by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), Schwinn replaced some of its
franchised distributors with owned outlets. The economic result turned out the same. Thus,
we should wonder about the sensibility of an unnecessary reorganization of their distribution
system.
74. Blair & Kaserman, Vertical Control with Variable Proportions: Ownership Integration and Contractual Equivalents, 46 S. EcoN. J. 1118 (1980) (establishes the economic
equivalence of several contractual alternatives to ownership integration).
75. See notes 15-24 and accompanying text, supra.
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manufacturer may turn to performance standards. This strategy provides similar results and is reasonably safe from antitrust challenge.
Performance standards may produce other problems. One of the difficulties
encountered in setting performance standards occurs where the standards are
set subsequent to the original franchise agreement. For example, a firm may
plan to specify maximum resale prices. Later, after realizing the illegality of
this practice, the firm will impose economically equivalent performance standards. This, however, poses difficulty because such a change in the business relationship could easily appear inequitable. Undoubtedly, the downstream firms
would resist the imposition of performance standards which operate to reduce
their profits. As a result, the manufacturer may decide to integrate forward by
engaging in dual distribution.76 Dual distribution, because it has attracted the
attention of the antitrust authorities, r" may present hazards for the franchisor.
The Sylvania court recognized the logic of this analysis as it pertains to nonprice vertical restrictions:
We also note that per se rules in this area may work to the ultimate
detriment of the small businessmen who operate as franchisees. To the
extent that a per se rule prevents a firm from using the franchise system
to achieve efficiencies that it perceives as important to its successful
operation, the rule creates an incentive for vertical integration into the
distribution system, thereby eliminating to that extent the role of independent businessmen.""
It is not clear why the Court persists in maintaining the Albrecht rule,79 which,
in encouraging vertical integration, produces the exact result the Court anticipated in Sylvania.
Total vertical integration is also hazardous since the upstream monopolist
must refuse to deal with his former distributors.8 0 Because vertical integration
is legal, any refusal to deal incident to vertical integration should also be
legal. 8' This, however, does not appear to be consistent with the case law.
The Supreme Court first considered the refusal to deal issue in United
States v. Colgate & Co. 8 2 In that case, Colgate required its distributors
to resell Colgate products at specified prices. Colgate refused to deal with a
distributor who persistently altered his prices. The Supreme Court stated explicitly that in the absence of a monopoly purpose, the Sherman Antitrust Act
allows a private business to choose freely with whom it will deal.8 3 Unfortu76. Dual distribution occurs when a manufacturer distributes his product through both
independent distributors and his own distribution centers.

77. See Regulators, Justice Takes Aim at Dual Distribution,Bus. WEEK July 7, 1980, at 24.
Under the leadership of Sanford M. Litvack, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice was prepared to prosecute criminal cases which involve dual distribution. Id. Consequently, dual distribution should not be undertaken lightly.
78. 433 U.S. at 54 ni.26.
79. See notes 19-24 and accompanying text, supra.
80. This follows because the output which maximizes profit does not change.
81. For a more general discussion of these matters see 3 P. ARzmA & D. TURNER, supra
note 14, 1728.
82. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
83. "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Anti-
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nately, the Colgate decision may apply to an upstream monopolist attempting
to engage in total vertical integration because such a firm refuses to sell to
former distributors,8 4 and intends to create a monopoly at the downstream
stage.85
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp.,86 demonstrates the generality of the suc-

cessive monopoly problem. In 1967, Fotomat obtained the rights to a drivethrough kiosk film processing and retailing concept. Thus, Fotomat maintained a monopoly for a rather narrowly defined product. 87 In 1968, Fotomat
granted a "block" franchise to Photovest covering the entire Indianapolis
metropolitan area. Consequently, Photovest was a local monopolist within the
assigned territory. Fotomat then collected its monopoly profit from Photovest
through a tying arrangement. 8 The franchise agreement permitted Photovest
to buy its processing from outside franchisor-approved sources. When Photovest
took advantage of this option, however, Fotomat began to operate directly in
the Indianapolis market. Photovest then brought suit alleging that Fotomat
was in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act for attempting to monopolize
the area photo processing drive-through market.89
To this point, the situation can be summarized. Fotomat, the franchisor,
wanted to exploit its monopoly power through a tying arrangement. Photovest,
the franchisee, exploited its local monopoly power through product pricing.
According to the earlier analysis, this exemplifies a successive monopoly.
If Fotomat was successful in supplanting Photovest and performing the
retail function itself, one layer of monopolistic restriction would be removed.
Consequently, retail prices should fall and output expand, a result clearly in
the consumer's interest. Interestingly, the result is no different when Photovest
wins.
Photovest has local monopoly power but its costs are high because Fotomat
is extracting monopoly profit through its processing charge. However, since
Fotomat cannot compel Photovest to buy its processing, Photovest should buy
competitively priced processing thereby removing one layer of monopoly
trust Act] does not restrict the long-recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an

entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal." Id. at 307.
84. Areeda and Turner reach a similar conclusion in their review of price and supply
squeeze cases. None of the other cases reviewed changes this conclusion. 3 P. ARETA &
D. TuRNER,supranote 14, at 235.

85. Since the purpose is to create a monopoly, the proviso in the Colgate rule does not
apply. See note 88 supra.
86. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).

87. The Seventh Circuit's analysis of the relevant market followed the traditional Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 825 (1962), indicia of submarkets. It found that the
drive-thru retail photo processing business constituted a relevant sub-market. 606 F.2d at
713-14.

88. In Blair &Kaserman, Vertical Integration, Tying, and Antitrust Policy, 68 Am. ECON.
REv. 897, 397-400 (1978), the writers demonstrated that tying arrangements and vertical
integration are economically equivalent ways for an upstream monopolist to extract all of the
monopoly profit that is available.
89. Photovest's allegation of a §2 violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act was vindicated
by the Seventh Circuit. 606 F.2d at 721.
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power. This, again, results in lower retail prices and higher output. Either
result- ownership integration by Fotomat or competitive input prices for
Photovest - leads to the same retail price and output configuration because a
unique price and output combination exists which maximizes profit in the
Indianapolis market. Consequently, there is no need to explicity consider consumer welfare because either result removes a layer of monopoly power.90
Both Supreme Court and lower court decisions suggest problems in vertically integrating to avoid existing franchisee problems.91 Consequently, the
firm that cannot start out as a vertically integrated entity may encounter
serious stumbling blocks to subsequent achievement of the desired firm structure.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Both Justices Stewart and Harlan, writing separate dissents in Albrecht,
explained the economic effect of fixing maximum resale prices. 92 Nevertheless,
the Court insisted upon a mechanical application of the per se rule against
price fixing even though maximum price fixing invariably occurs in successive
monopoly situations 3 Application of the Albrecht rule to this particular
market structure results in a pyramiding of monopolistic output restrictions in
the vertical distribution chain, which, in turn, causes declining output and
raises consumer prices. Assuming that consumer welfare is the paramount
concern of antitrust laws, Albrecht, as Stewart noted, clearly "stands the Sherman Act on its head." 94 Therefore, the Supreme Court should, at the earliest
opportunity, reconsider A lb recht.
Considerable scholarly research supports the assertion that consumer welfare is of paramount concern in antitrust legislation despite some Supreme
90. The astute reader will recognize a bit of hyperbole here. If Fotomat won, there would
be monopoly at the retail level. Since Photovest won, Fotomat can engage in dual distribution and compete with Photovest at the retail level. Under some conditions this could lead to
an erosion of Fotomat's monopoly power. This, however, deflects our attention from the
central point regarding successive monopoly.
91. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text, supra. In Speed Auto Sales, Inc. v. American
Motors Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), American Motors began competing with one
of its franchisees. The franchisee alleged a §2 Sherman Act violation. Id. at 1196-98. The
district court dismissed the case observing that a manufacturer is entitled to change his
franchising policies without violating the antitrust laws. Id. In Byars v. Bluff City News Co.,
609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979), however, the court remanded a similar case for explicit consideration of Bluff City's reasons for refusing to deal with Byars. Id. at 864. By merely changing its franchising policy, Bluff City found itself facing antitrust charges. Thus, the implications for upstream firms are not perfectly clear.
92. 390 U.S. at 156. Justice Harlan distinguished price floors from price ceilings. Price
floors were considered invariably harmful because they lessened competition, therefore mandating the per se rules application. On the other hand, price ceilings should not be afforded
"per se" treatment because they did not tend to lessen competition. Id. at 158-59 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stewart maintained that the maximum price rule actually furthered the
purpose of antitrust law, because it protected homeowners from Petitioner's territorial monopoly. Id. at 168 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 151-52.
94. Id. at 170.
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Court language to the contrary.95 Thorelli, for one, has produced an impressive
history of the Sherman Act. 98 He offers extensive quotes from Senator Sherman's defense of his bill showing clearly Sherman's deep concern for the consumer. 97 Thorelli's review of the legislative history led him to conclude that
Congress advocated more competition. Moreover, "[t]here can be no doubt that
the Congress felt that the ultimate beneficiary in this whole process was the
consumer ....

98

Letwin, an astute economic historian, notes that one of the various trust
abuses which led to passage of the Sherman Act 99 was consumer*victimization
caused by high prices. Finally, Bork has analyzed the purpose of the antitrust
laws from two perspectives. 00 The first perspective is the declared legislative
intent, which, according to Bork's analysis of the legislative history, clearly indicates that Congress' exclusive purpose was the promotion of consumer welfare. 01 Furthermore, the courts were not to balance consumer welfare against
social values. 02 The second perspective is the legislative intent which can be
inferred from a structural analysis of the statute. This, too, reveals an overriding concern for consumer welfare. 03 The work of Thorelli, Letwin, and
Bork is compelling: the antitrust laws originally purported to protect and
promote consumer welfare. The Albrecht rule clearly does not do so.
CONCLUSION

The lingering distinction between vertical price and nonprice restrictions
makes little sense. As Bork pointed out, "vertical restraints are, in economic
terms, all of a piece. They should be either all illegal per se or all unqualifiedly
lawful."'. 04 When the Court upholds one vertical restraint while condemning
its economic equivalent, it is forced into a kind of logical inconsistency. Nonetheless, the rule of reason treatment advocated in Sylvania for non-price vertical
95. For example, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962), the Court

decided that Congress was willing to sacrifice efficiency as evidenced by higher costs and prices
in order to preserve "small, locally owned businesses." One distinguished commentator, however, has pointed out that there is "no credible support for the statement in Brown Shoe
that Congress appreciated the possible efficiency cost of attempting to preserve fragmented
industries and consciously resolved the competing considerations in favor of decentralization."
Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAxv. L. REv. 1313, 1326

(1965).
96. H. THORELLI, THE FEDEaI ANTIRrusr PoLcy 164-234 (1955).
97. Id. at 180-85.
98. Id. at 227. Thorelli goes on to point out that the immediate, as opposed to ultimate,
beneficiary was probably the small businessman. Id.
99. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1877-1890, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 221,

235 (1956).
100. R. BoRK, supra note 48, at 50-71. A more detailed treatment is provided in Bork,
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. ECON. 7 (1966).
101. R. BoIx, supranote 48, at 61.
102. Id. at 66. "The legislative histories of the antitrust statutes, therefore, do not support
any claim that Congress intended the courts to sacrifice consumer welfare to any other goal."
Id.
103. Id.
104. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. Cr. Rv. 171, 173.
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restraints is a positive step. Surely such treatment should extend to fixing maximum prices, although it could go further.
An upstream monopolist will attempt to impose maximum resale prices
when faced with a successive monopoly situation. The manufacturer is motivated not by altruism, but by profits. In this case, however, the interests of the
manufacturer coincide with the interests of the consumer. Therefore, whenever the industry structure is one of successive monopoly, the judiciary should
permit constraints on downstream pricing discretion1o5
105. The same analysis applies to patent and copyright licensors. If the licensor is permitted to restrict the licensee's pricing discretion, it will be possible to prevent a successive

monopoly situation from surfacing.
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